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Fault and Equity: Implied Indemnity After
Houdaille
GEORGE W. CHESROW,* ROGER B. HOWARD,** AND JEAN G.
HOWARD***
This article examines the doctrine of implied indemnity in
light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in
Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards. The authors discuss the
meaning of "fault" and "no fault" in terms of the mechanisms
of accident law, develop three models for allocating accident
losses, and evaluate the change in accident law introduced in
Houdaille, concluding that the court achieved conceptual con-
sistency at the expense of equity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Accident law' is a set of legal and equitable mechanisms for
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1. The specific legal domain of this article is the law governing accident cases, which we
will call "accident law." See, e.g., Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to
Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. Rzv. 713 (1965). Although most of accident law is
tort law, there are exceptions. See Dickerson, Products Liability and the Disorderly Con-
duct of Words, 20 ATLA. L. REP. 422 (1977).
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allocating loss.2 If the defendants are found liable to the plaintiff,
then the plaintiff's loss is allocated to the defendants jointly.$ If
the plaintiff is comparatively negligent, part of the loss is allocated
to the plaintiff and part to the defendants jointly. Contribution,"
indemnity,5 and subrogation6 allocate part or all of the loss among
2. See generally Greenstone, Spreading the Loss-Indemnity, Contribution, Compara-
tive Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FoRuM 266 (1977); LeFlar, Contribution and Indem-
nity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
3. The concept of joint liability provides the underlying premise for allocation of loss in
accident law. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 291 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, two or
more parties, whose acts together cause a unitary loss, are each liable for the full amount of
that loss; absent a claim for contribution or indemnity, the plaintiff may recover the whole
amount from either. See Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399
(1939) and Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937). Florida
has expanded the common law definition of joint tort to encompass independent concurring
torts by parties having no prior relationship to each other. De La Concha v. Pinero, 104 So.
2d 25 (Fla. 1958); Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Hernandez v. Pensacola
Coach Corp., 141 Fla. 441, 193 So. 555 (1940); Feinstone v. Allison Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302,
143 So. 251 (1932).
4. In 1975, the Florida Legislature adopted the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979). Subsection (3)(a) of the Act originally provided
for a pro rata distribution of loss among joint tortfeasors. Id. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975). See
Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Comment, The Case for Comparative Con-
tribution in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1976); 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 747 (1976). One
year after the adoption of the Act, the legislature amended subsection (3)(a) to provide that
in determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability "[tiheir relative de-
grees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability." FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1979)
(emphasis added).
Basically, contribution is an equitable concept providing for the equalization of
financial burdens and the fair division of losses between tortfeasors. Therefore, "[o]ne who
is compelled to pay or satisfy the whole or to bear more than his just share of a common
burden or obligation, upon which several persons are equally liable or which they are bound
to discharge . . .[may] obtain from [the others] payment of their respective shares." 18 AM.
JUR. 2d Contribution § 1 (1965).
5. Parties may provide for indemnity by contract; courts also recognize implied indem-
nity, based on an implied contract, to prevent unjust enrichment. As Prosser says, "the duty
to indemnify will be recognized in cases where community opinion would consider that in
justice the responsibility should rest upon one rather than the other." W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, § 51, at 313.
The court in Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1979) defined
indemnity as: "a right which inures to one who discharges a duty owed by him, but which,
as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other."
The historically accepted definition of indemnity was broader:
The idea of indemnity implies a primary or basic liability in one person,
though a second person is also for some reason liable with the first, or even
without the first, to a third person. Discharge of the obligation by the second
person leaves him with a right to secure compensation from the one who, as
between themselves, is primarily liable.
Leflar, supra note 2, at 146 (footnote omitted). See also note 96 infra.
6. Subrogation is also an equitable remedy, whereby one who has paid for a claimed
loss stands in the complainant's shoes vis-a-vis the wrongdoer, thereby obtaining a cause of
action against the wrongdoer. Not based on fault, subrogation represents the last truly equi-
[Vol. 34:727
INDEMNITY AFTER HOUDAILLE
the defendants and other litigants who could be held jointly liable"
to the plaintiff.8 Through these multiple mechanisms, current acci-
table remedy available to the litigants. In Rebozo v. Royal Indem. Co., 369 So. 2d 644 (Fla.
3d DCA 1979), the court stated:
The doctrine of subrogation is pure equity, having foundation in principles of
natural justice. It rests, not on contract, but on the natural principles of right
and justice, when applied to the facts of the particular case, and includes every
instance in which one who is not a volunteer pays the debt of another *** It is
applied only when necessary to bring about equitable adjustment of a claim
founded on right and natural justice.
Id. at 646 (quoting American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 305 F.2d 633,
634-35 (5th Cir. 1962) (quoting Vance v. Atherton, 252 Ky. 591, 595, 67 S.W.2d 968, 970
(1934))).
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has adopted subrogation as a solution to
the inequities resulting from the unavailability of contribution or indemnity between succes-
sive tortfeasors. City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 373 So. 2d 944 (Fla.
4th DCA 1979). In Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla.
1980), the supreme court approved the decision by the district court, accepting subrogation
as a means of achieving an equitable apportionment of liability when injuries originally
caused in part by an initial tortfeasor have been negligently aggravated by a doctor. See text
accompanying note 137 infra.
7. The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act defined the term "joint
tortfeasors" to mean "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury to person or property, whether or not a judgment had been recovered against all or
some of them." 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 233 (1957), § 1, Commissioner's Notes. The 1955
revision of the Act eliminated the definition of "joint tortfeasors" allegedly to avoid
problems of interpretation in jurisdictions in which those who acted independently and not
in concert could not be joined as defendants in the same action. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 1,
Commissioner's Comment a at 64 (1975) (1955 revision). Florida follows the concept that if
the negligence of two or more persons concurs in producing a single indivisible injury, joint
and several liability exists even though there is no common duty, design or concerted action.
This gives FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1979) virtually the same meaning as the 1939 Uniform
Act. The court in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977), however, made clear that
injury resulting from successive wrongs would not be considered to produce joint liability.
Finally, loss allocation through contribution and indemnity generally operates in two
ways. First, a defendant can plead one or the other against a codefendant. Alternatively, he
can plead either contribution or indemnity against a third party. In the latter case, the
defendant has the burden of showing that the third party defendant is liable for the plain-
tiff's loss.
8. The Supreme Court of Florida adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The court described the process of computing loss allocation
between the plaintiff and defendant:
If it appears from the evidence that both plaintiff and defendant were guilty of
negligence which was, in some degree, a legal cause of the injury to the plaintiff,
this does not defeat the plaintiff's recovery, entirely. The jury in assessing dam-
ages would in that event award to the plaintiff such damages as in the jury's
judgment the negligence of the defendant caused to the plaintiff. In other words,
the jury should apportion the negligence of the plaintiff and the negligence of
the defendant; then, in reaching the amount due the plaintiff, the jury should
give the plaintiff only such an amount proportioned with his negligence and the
negligence of the defendant.
Id. at 438.
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dent law sometimes falls into inconsistency.
The concept of fault is critical to an understanding of loss al-
location. In HoudaiUe Industries, Inc. v. Edwards," the Supreme
Court of Florida severely restricted the availability of implied in-
demnity 0 as a mechanism of accident law, by requiring a success-
9. 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
10. The court also strictly construed contractual indemnity. In Charles Poe Masonry,
Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip. Co., 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979), decided the
same day as Houdaille, the court held that the following equipment lease provision did not
constitute an agreement by the lessee, Poe, to indemnify the lessor, Spring Lock, even where
lessee and lessor were joint tortfeasors: "The LESSEE assumes all responsibility for claims
asserted by any person whatever growing out of the erection and maintenance, use or pos-
session of said equipment, and agrees to hold the COMPANY harmless from all such
claims." Id. at 489 (emphasis added by the court); see note 96 infra.
The court noted that the public policy disfavoring contracts of indemnification requires
that such contracts show an intent to indemnify in clear and unequivocal terms. 374 So. 2d
at 489. Thus, a clause providing that the "Lessee shall indemnify LESSOR and save it
harmless from suits. . . occasioned wholly or in part by any act or omission of Lessee..."
sufficiently expresses clear intent to indemnify lessor in cases where lessee and lessor are
jointly at fault. Id. (quoting Leonard L. Farber Co. v. Jaksch, 335 So. 2d 847, 848, (1976)
(emphasis added by the Poe court)). See also Walter Taft Bradshaw & Assoc. v. Bedsole,
374 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (no intent expressed in clear and unambiguous terms for
subcontractor to indemnify landscape contractor or designer); A-T-O, Inc. v. Garcia, 374 So.
2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (no contractual indemnity where construction contract failed to
provide monetary limitation or specific consideration to indemnitor pursuant to FLA. STAT. §
725.06 (1979)); Air Agency, Inc. v. British Airways, 370 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (no
evidence of contract providing indemnity of active tortfeasor).
In W.R. Fairchild Constr. Co. v. Fairchild-Florida Constr. Co., 369 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1979), decided before Springlock and Houdaille, the court affirmed that the language
"Subcontractor agrees to indemnify and save Contractor harmless from all claims, de-
mands, costs, expenses, interest and attorneys' fees whatsoever arising out of or pertaining
to the subcontract and the performance or failure to perform same," constituted an agree-
ment to indemnify the contractor for damages imposed on the basis of strict liability. Id. at
654-55 (emphasis added). The basis of the court's decision was the pre-Houdaille distinction
between active and passive negligence and the view that strict liability means merely passive
negligence. Id. at 655. Arguably, the court also assumed (as in Houdaille, later) that strict
liability involves no fault. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
During 1979, the courts decided several cases involving the right to attorney's fees in
indemnity actions. In Brown v. Financial Indem. Co., 366 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979),
the court held that on the basis of an indemnification contract an indemnitee could recover
attorney's fees in both the trial and appellate court. But in light of the indemnity clause
involved in Misener Marine Constr. Co. v. Southport Marine, Inc., 377 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1979), the court held that a contractor had no right to indemnification for attorney's
fees incurred in defending against the claim of an injured employee. The services of the
employee had arisen from the duties of the contractor and not in connection with the per-
formance of the subcontractor, while the indemnity clause protected the contractor solely
"against 'all claims . . . based upon or arising out of damages or injury to persons . . .
sustained in connection with the performance of this subcontract'" Id. at 758.
Attorney's fees may be awarded on the basis of implied indemnity when there is no
contractual or statutory basis. In Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stevenson, 370 So. 2d 1211
(Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the court held that an independent insurance agent could recover attor-
ney's fees for having had to defend himself solely because of the fault of his principal, the
[Vol. 34:727
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ful indemnitee to be "without fault."11 Previously, the court had
defined liability, comparative negligence, and contribution in terms
of fault." The Houdaille court, then, implicitly sought a consistent
basis for the mechanisms of loss allocation. In each context, "fault"
should denote the same idea; "fault" and "no fault" should mutu-
ally exclude each other, to achieve consistent justice. Thus, one
mechanism for allocating loss should not categorize a particular set
of facts as involving "fault" while another mechanism classifies a
similar set of facts as involving "no fault."
This article first explores the meanings of "fault" and "no
fault" as used by the courts in accident law, to predict from those
definitions the contexts in which courts will allow implied indem-
nity. The analysis shows that the court has used "fault" and "no
fault" consistently only if "fault" denotes culpable conduct and
"no fault" denotes nonculpable conduct that nevertheless gives rise
insurance company. Id. at 1213; see note 91 infra.
A landlord may have to indemnify a tenant for attorney's fees incurred in defending
rights as tenant against a third party. In Robinson v. Bailey, 370 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979), the court upheld a finding that the tenants had a right to indemnification for attor-
ney's fees from a landlord who failed to defend tenants against a third party seeking an
injunction requiring tenants to surrender the property based on the landlord's actions.
(Subsequent to the lease, the landlord had entered into an option with a third party to sell
leased land; the third party then sought to remove the tenants from the land.)
The right of indemnification or contribution for cost of defense does not extend to at-
torney's fees in defense of a mutual insured. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 372 So.
2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Whether the court would uphold a contract providing for in-
demnification or contribution between insurance companies seems unlikely, although the
Argonaut court cited Brayman v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 381 F. Supp. 362 (D. Colo.
1974) (no contribution or indemnification for attorney's fees between insurers, absent a spe-
cific contractual right). 372 So. 2Fd at 963. Florida public policy encouraging insurance com-
panies to settle and protect the interest of their insured precludes a contractual agreement
for indemnity or contribution for attorney's fees between insurers. Id. at 964.
11. 374 So. 2d at 493 (Fla. 1979). "A weighing of the relative fault of tortfeasors has no
place in the concept of indemnity for the one seeking indemnity must be without fault." Id.
See also Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1978); Stuart v. Hertz
Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977). The concept of fault first entered into indemnity through
translation of the phrase "not in pari delicto" [not in equal fault]. See note 110 infra.
12. Of liability, the court in Hoffman v. Jones said: "In the field of tort law, the most
equitable result that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault."
280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
The same court tied the doctrine of comparative negligence to the concept of fault: "If
plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former may recover, but the amount of his
recovery may be only such proportion of the entire damages plaintiff sustained as the defen-
dant's negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant."
Id.
As for contribution, the Florida Statute applies a "fault" standard. See FLA. STAT. §
768.31(3)(a) (1979); note 4 supra.
1980]
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to liability.13 The article then develops three models of accident
law, based on the three goals of accident law: allocating loss to the
wrongdoer,14 compensating the injured party,15 and minimizing the
misallocation of economic resources, through enterprise liability.1
Seen within this analytical framework, the Houdaille decision ap-
pears to have achieved conceptual consistency at the cost of equity.
For in cases in which contribution is unavailable as a loss-alloca-
tion mechanism, a "no fault" basis for implied indemnity produces
inequitable results.
II. LIABILITY AND FAULT
Three categories of behavior give rise to liability in accident
law. In the first category, a party negligently 7 or intentionally s
breaches a duty owed to another, thereby causing an injury.
Breach of duty causing an injury is one variety of culpable wrong-
doing, or culpable fault.'9 The driver of an automobile who injures
another has breached a duty to the injured party. The driver is
culpably at fault and therefore is liable for those injuries which
were a natural consequence of his acts.20 Likewise, the manufac-
13. See note 36 and accompanying text infra.
14. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 2, at 9; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
15. Prosser explains that "[t]he civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is commenced
and maintained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is to compensate him for the
damage he has suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 2, at
7. See generally Calabresi, supra note 1.
16. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 28, at 14-16; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Walkowiak, Implied Indem-
nity: A Policy Analysis of the Total Loss Shifting Remedy in a Partial Loss Shifting Juris-
diction, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 501, 514, 540-42 (1978).
17. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 28, at 139-40.
18. See id. §§ 7-8, at 28-34.
19. There is no universally accepted term for fault based on breach of duty to the
plaintiff. Some of the more common terms are "negligence," Continental Ins. Co. v. Sabine
Towing Co., 117 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1941); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla.
1973); Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary with an Old
Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447, 462-63 (1978); "wrongful conduct" or "personal fault,"
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); "causal negligence," Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 192
(1973); "fault or culpable conduct," Levine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative
Negligence: The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 353 (1977);
"actual fault or active negligence," Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978) (citing 28 FLA. JUR. Sales § 157 (1968)); "moral responsibility," W. PROSSER,
supra note 3, § 75, at 492.
20. E.g., Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975) (equation of liability with
fault); Baston v. Shelton, 152 Fla. 879, 13 So. 2d 453 (1943) (actionable negligence is failure
to use ordinary care and procedure to avoid injury to another when failure to do so will
probably cause injury in the ordinary case).
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turer or seller of a defective product may negligently breach a duty
to the person injured by that product.2' If so, he is culpably at
fault and liable for the plaintiff's injuries.2"
Second, a court may hold a party to an accident liable as a
matter of law, not because of wrongdoing on his part, but because
public policy imputes to him the negligence of another.28 As a mat-
ter of law, the owner of an automobile must pay for the damages
caused by his automobile, driven negligently by another, because
the law imputes to the owner the negligence of the driver.2 4 Simi-
larly, the law imputes to an employer the negligence of an em-
ployee if during the course and scope of his employment he injures
someone else.25 The concept of legal fault underlies imputed liabil-
ity and differs qualitatively from culpable fault.
Third, a court may hold a party liable on a theory of strict
liability or breach of implied warranty.2 6 Theoretically, his liability
21. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
(manufacturer of bus had duty to use safe glass). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96,
at 641-50.
22. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 96.
23. See Leflar, supra note 2, at 148. Again, there is no one universally accepted term for
liability without moral or culpable fault. Some of the common terms are: "without personal
fault," RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937); "legally liable," Sherk, Common Law In-
demnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 7 ARIZ. L. REV. 59, 65 (1965); "legal fault," Wade, Prod-
ucts Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L.
REV. 373, 376 (1978); "without negligence," Continental Ins. Co. v. Sabine Towing Co., 117
F.2d 694, 697 n.4 (5th Cir. 1941); "relative fault," Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 187 (1973).
24. E.g., Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963); South-
ern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
25. The basis for the employer's liability derives from the maxim "respondeat supe-
rior." W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §§ 68-70, at 458-61. See also Weaver v. Hale, 82 Fla. 88, 89
So. 363 (1921); Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690, 86 So. 695 (1920); Varnes v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry., 80 Fla. 624, 86 So. 433 (1920).
Where the servant inflicts injury on another through a highly dangerous instrumental-
ity, the employer's liability merges with the "dangerous instrumentality" doctrine. E.g.,
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). See Maldonado v. Jack
M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1977) (employer-landowner legally liable for
negligence of employee). See also American Home Assur. Co. v. City of Opa Locka, 368 So.
2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (city vicariously liable for action of police officer); Gold Coast
Parking, Inc. v. Brownlow, 362 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (parking lot owner and in-
surer vicariously liable for tort of helper).
26. E.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). See generally Jen-
svold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability
Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 734-35 (1974). Jensvold declares that
the object of strict liability is also to achieve an equitable distribution of losses.
However, like all substantive rules of tort law, the doctrine of strict liability re-
flects an implicit value judgment as to who should ultimately bear a loss. It is in
part premised upon the notion that economic losses caused by unsafe products
should be borne by manufacturers and distributors of the products who are bet-
ter able to insure against or otherwise spread losses among the industry than are
19801
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does not arise from any acts of negligence on his part, but rather
from having engaged in conduct that created a risk ultimately
causing the plaintiff's injuries. 7 The manufacturer or retailer of a
defective product may be held liable because the product was de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous (thus risk-creating) and
caused the plaintiff's injuries.26 Florida courts have held that strict
liability and breach of implied warranty involve culpable fault, a
view not universally shared.' 9
The term "fault" as used by the courts in determining liability
has two meanings. First, fault means liability based on culpable
individual consumers.
27. See generally Fletcher, supra note 14.
28. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
29. Id. The concept of strict liability raised the specter of distributing loss in the ab-
sence of fault or, alternatively, defining strict liability to include fault. Florida chose the
latter alternative, viewing the action of strict liability as negligence per se. Id. at 90.
In strict liability, as in the negligence branch of vicarious liability, fault means negli-
gence which caused the injury. The causal requirement is one of the elements of strict liabil-
ity. In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the theory of strict liability, a user must
establish the manufacturer's relationship to the product, and the existence of the proximate
causal connection. Id. at 87. If no causal connection is proved, the manufacturer is consid-
ered to be without fault and is not liable under a theory of products liability. Watson v.
Lucerne Mach. & Equip., Inc., 347 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (manufacturer not liable
for defective machine when employee crawled under conveyor belt and had head crushed by
rotating arm of machine); Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
(strict liability in tort does not connote liability without fault).
The relation between cause and fault in strict liability is further illustrated by the con-
cept of independent fault. In Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the
court held that dog owners were not liable for injuries suffered by a veterinarian's assistant
despite strict liability under the Florida dogbite statute. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (1979). The
court found that the veterinarian's actions in handling the dog amounted to "[ain interven-
ing efficient independent fault which solely cause[d] or result[ed] in injury [and] relieve[d]
the owner of an animal from liability." 356 So. 2d at 371.
For a discussion of fault (or no-fault) theories of products liability, see J. ALPERT, PROD-
ucTS LIABILITY § 5 (1979) (strict liability does not impose liability in the absence of fault,
but presumes fault in the marketing of an unreasonably dangerous defective product). Ac-
cording to Wade, supra note 23, at 376-77:
Conduct that is characterized as negligent is commonly recognized as fault. But
a term sometimes used as a synonym for strict liability is liability without fault.
Yet the two tend to fade into each other and are not utterly different in kind.
[S]trict liability (whether for products, animals, or abnormally danger-
ous activities) is not accurately characterized as liability without fault ....
This is legal fault, and it can be mixed with, and compared with, fault of the
morally reprehensible type. One does not have to stigmatize conduct as negligent
in order to characterize it as fault.
See also Parks, Watts-Fitzgerald & Watts-Fitzgerald, Products Liability, 33 U. MIAMI L.
Rav. 1185, 1203-11 (1979), distinguishing cause-in-fact from proximate cause in products
liability cases.
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fault: a party culpably at fault is liable to the injured party. 0 This
meaning obviously does not include liability based on legal (im-
puted) fault."' Second, fault sometimes means liability based on
either culpable or legal fault. 2 In this sense fault is synonymous
with liability in accident law.
III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND FAULT
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, a defendant
may have the plaintiff's loss apportioned between the plaintiff and
the defendant according to their relative fault. 3 Not specifically
defined, "fault" in a given case is what the jury determines on the
facts before it84 More broadly, fault in comparative negligence
may mean either culpable fault alone or both culpable and legal
fault, depending on whether the actions of the jury or the actions
of the legal system as a whole define fault. 5 This becomes clear
upon analysis of the three categories of behavior defining lia-
bility.3 6
When the defendant is liable for negligence (culpable fault),
the courts have uniformly permitted the defense of comparative
negligence. The driver of an automobile37 or the negligent manu-
facturer may plead comparative neligence against the plaintiff, and
the court may ask the jury to determine the degree of each party's
fault. 3 Comparative negligence is also a defense to strict liability
30. See note 19 supra.
31. See note 23 supra.
32. Thus, in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), the court stated: "In the field
of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of
liability with fault." Id. at 438. See Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). Because
a party may be held liable for legal or implied negligence, this meaning of fault must include
both culpable and legal fault.
33. 280 So. 2d at 438.
34. The Florida Standard Jury Instructions, prepared by the Supreme Court Commit-
tee on Standard Jury Instructions, do not use the word "fault." The court in Hoffman,
however, couched its analysis of comparative negligence in terms of the "proportionate fault
of each party." 280 So. 2d at 439. Thus, it is the jury which operationally defines fault: "In
accomplishing these purposes, the trial court is authorized to require special verdicts to be
returned by the jury and to enter such judgment or judgments as may truly reflect the
intent of the jury as expressed in any verdict or verdicts which may be returned." Id.
35. The court shapes the case through its rulings on motions (e.g., to dismiss, to clarify
or strike, or to give judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment). The court may
thus eliminate those cases which as a matter of law do not reach the threshold of fault
necessary to take the case to the jury.
36. See notes 17-29 and accompanying text supra.
37. Moore v. St. Cloud Utilities, 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
38. Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
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and breach of implied warranty.3 Since both involve culpable
fault, the jury determines the relative culpability of the defendants
and the plaintiff. Logically, culpable fault provides the basis for
the verdict.
The courts recognize that comparative negligence is a valid de-
fense to legal liability, but they do not permit the jury to consider
the legal fault of the defendants. Instead, the courts invoke the
rule of equity that requires class liability, including the common
liability arising from legally imputed fault, to be treated as a single
legal cause of the plaintiffs loss. 40 The verdict form asks the jury
to determine and weigh the fault of the plaintiff and the defend-
ants, but does not distinguish between the legal fault of the owner
and the culpable fault of the driver.4 1 By pairing the driver and
owner, a court finds the owner liable as a matter of law, contingent
only on the liability of the driver, and will permit the comparative
negligence of the plaintiff as a defense to the class liability of both
defendants, irrespective of the nature of each one's fault." Thus,
viewed as what the jury decides, fault means culpable fault. The
legal system as a whole, however, provides a decisionmaking frame-
work that operates on a concept of liability based on both culpable
and legal fault.
39. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
40. Moore v. St. Cloud Utilities, 337 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
41. Moore illustrates this point. A pickup truck driven by Miller but owned by Cassel's
Garage ran into a utility pole, knocking down the attached powerlines. Plaintiff was injured
when the car in which he was riding stopped so that the driver could help Miller. Plaintiff
brought an action against Miller (the driver of the truck), Cassel's Garage (the owner of the
truck), the utility company (the owner of the pole and wires), and various other defendants.
The defendants pled comparative negligence, and the trial court submitted a special interro-
gatory verdict to the jury, which found plaintiff liable for 20% of his loss and Miller and
Cassel's Garage jointly liable for 20%, distributing the remaining liability among the other
defendants. Id. at 983. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed on the
ground that comparative negligence did not permit the jury to apportion damages among
the defendants, and ruled that Miller and the utility company were jointly and severally
liable for the full amount of the loss attributed to their negligence. Id. at 984.
In not treating Cassel's Garage as an independently negligent party, the court recog-
nized the legal nature of the owner's liability. Id. at 983. The trial court, however, had asked
the jury to determine liability based solely on culpable fault. It was asked to weigh the
culpable fault of the defendants and the plaintiff but was not permitted to consider the
legal fault of Cassel's Garage separately from the culpable fault of Miller. The legal liability
of Cassel's Garage was a question not of fact but of law, already determined by the court in
equating the garage with Miller in the verdict form.
42. Id. at 984.
[Vol. 34:727
INDEMNITY AFTER HOUDAILLE
IV. CONTRIBUTION, IMPLIED INDEMNITY, AND FAULT
Accident law provides two mutually exclusive mechanisms
for shifting loss among defendants and third parties who may be
held liable to the plaintiff. The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act's permits the finder of fact to allocate loss among
liable defendants and third party defendants as a function of their
fault. Implied indemnity permits the court or the jury to shift the
entire loss attributable to one defendant to another liable defend-
ant or third party defendant. Implied indemnity arises only if (a)
the indemnitor has breached a duty to the indemnitee, and (b) the
plaintiff can hold the indemnitee liable for the plaintiff's injuries
arising from the indemnitor's conduct." The Contribution Act
states that if implied indemnity is available as a mechanism for
loss distribution, contribution will not apply.45 Thus, the joint bur-
den of the defendants held liable to the plaintiff may be allocated
by one of two mutually exclusive mechanisms.
A. Contribution and Fault
Fault in contribution is similar to fault in comparative negli-
gence, with the added complexity that legal fault will always be
within the domain of implied indemnity."' When defendants are"
both liable for negligence and therefore both culpably at fault, the
courts have uniformly permitted the defendants to plead contribu-
tion and have instructed the juries to allocate loss according to the
fault of the parties jointly liable.4 7 The driver of an automobile has
a right to contribution from another tortfeasor who jointly caused
plaintiff's injuries, with the jury to determine the degree of fault of
each negligent defendant.' s Likewise, a manufacturer held strictly
43. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979). The relevant text of the Act is set forth in note 4 supra.
44. Id. § 768.31(1)(f) states:
(f) This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
When one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the in-
demnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obli-
gor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indem-
nity obligation.
45. Id.
46. The Supreme Court views fault in comparative negligence and contribution as es-
sentially equivalent. In Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391 (Fla. 1975), the court sum-
marized its position on fault in both doctrines: "There is no equitable justification for recog-
nizing the right of the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault while
denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent defendants."
47. See, e.g., Lincenberg, 318 So. 2d 386.
48. In Lincenberg, the court set forth the full special interrogatory verdict used by the
trial court to apportion damages between the negligent parties involved in an automobile
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liable or found to have breached an implied warranty may gener-
ally recover from a jointly liable party whose affirmative negligence
helped cause the plaintiff's injuries."' Legal fault, however, has al-
ways been removed from the domain of contribution and treated
through the mechanism of implied indemnity. While the jury de-
termines the culpable fault of the parties, other aspects of the sys-
tem define "fault" when it includes both culpable and legal fault.50
B. Implied Indemnity and Fault Before Houdaille
Before Houdaille,1 courts took three main approaches in de-
accident. 318 So. 2d at 387-88.
49. E.g., Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); West v. Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
50. In Lincenberg, the plaintiff sued the driver of the automobile in which she was
riding and the driver and owner of the second automobile. The trial court submitted a spe-
cial interrogatory verdict containing the following clauses, which distinguished the negli-
gence of the drivers but equated the negligence of the driver and owner of the second car:
"1. Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant, HARRY LINCENBERG, which was
the legal cause of this accident? ... 2. Was there negligence on the part of Defendants,
ELEANOR RHODES and RONALD ANGELO RHODES, which was the legal cause of the
accident?" 318 So. 2d at 387-88. The basis for considering the owner and driver as a single
unit appears in FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(b) (1979): "If equity requires, the collective liability
of some as a group shall constitute a single share." In this connection, the Commissioners'
Comments on § 2 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act make it clear that
vicarious relationships should be treated as class liabilities: "Second, [the Act] invokes the
rule of equity which requires class liability, including the common liability arising from vica-
rious relationships, to be treated as a single share." 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57, 87 (1975)
(1955 revision).
In 1976 the legislature amended the Florida version of the Act to permit apportionment
of damages among defendants according to relative fault. The rule about class liabilities
remains. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1979).
51. Indemnity actions originated in contract. See generally Davis, Indemnity Between
Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1952); Leflar, supra
note 2; O'Donnell, Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public
Policy Analysis, 6 S'rON HALL L. REV. 268 (1975); Walkowiak, supra note 16.
Contractual indemnity allowing a party to indemnify itself against its own wrongful acts
is permissible even though the court views such agreements with disfavor. See note 11
supra.
The action soon spread to implied contract under an equitable theory of preventing
unjust enrichment. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106
Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932) (railroad entitled to indemnity where electric company negli-
gently performed its contractual duty of maintaining and operating signal system, on
grounds of implied duty to keep wires from sagging). A good description of the contractual
theory behind implied indemnity is found in F.J. Walker, Ltd. v. Motor Vessel
"Lemoncore," 561 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1977):
A stevedore owes a warranty of workmanlike performance to the vessel. In fulfil-
ling this warranty, the stevedore owes the vessel a duty to use such care and
diligence as an- ordinarily prudent and skillful person would use in the same
circumstance . . . .However, proof of a breach of the warranty of workmanlike
performance does not ipso facto establish a right to indemnity by the vessel.
[Vol. 34:727
INDEMNITY AFTER HOUDAILLE
termining whether the facts of a particular case gave rise to a right
of implied indemnity.52 First, a court might impute an indemni-
tee's liability from the acts of another.5 For example, the owner of
a negligently driven vehicle could seek implied indemnity from the
driver if the owner's liability to the plaintiff derived solely from
ownership of the vehicle.54 Likewise, an employer could obtain im-
Obviously, if such breach is not an operative factor in the damages that occur, or
if conduct on the part of the shipowner causes the injury, indemnity should be
denied.
Id. at 1148 (citations omitted). See also 41 AM. JuR. 2d Indemnity § 2 (describing the equi-
table basis of implied indemnity).
Policy determines which circumstances will support an action in implied indemnity, as
Leflar shows:
The doctrine of respondeat superior and its fellow doctrines, both statutory and
common law, imposing liability irrespective of fault, have operated as a sort of
social insurance, lifting the burden of loss off the innocent individual upon
whom it happened to fall, and shifting it onto another innocent person who nor-
mally has some opportunity to spread it over a portion of society as a whole by
adding it to the total cost of production or risk of ownership in the area of social
activity out of which the injury arose.
Leflar, supra note 2, at 148. See also Davis, supra, at 536.
52. There have been many schemes for categorizing the situations in which the courts
have allowed indemnity. Leflar, for example, classified indemnity actions as contractual or
quasi-contractual ("arising out of a 'contract implied by law' "). Leflar, supra note 2, at 146.
He then subdivided implied indemnity on the basis of three possible situations: (1) The
improper act of one person produces injury and the law permits the injured person to re-
cover for his injury from someone other than the actor. In such cases the actor, or possibly
someone standing in his stead, must indemnify the one who has been held liable without
fault for the actor's misconduct. Id. at 147. In this category, Leflar included liability of a
carrier (based on respondeat superior) for the negligence of a connecting carrier, liability of
a municipal corporation for a defect created by another, liability of the occupier of premises
for dangerous conditions created by another, liabilty of the lessor for acts of the lessee. Id.
at 149-50. (2) One voluntarily but innocently and in good faith doing at the direction of
another person an act which on its face appears lawful and proper, but which is in fact
tortious. Id. at 150. (3) When the indemnitor had the last clear chance. Leflar rejected the
distinction between active and passive negligence as artificial in the context of the third
category. Id. at 154.
53. Under this theory of implied indemnity, one who because of a prior relationship
with the wrongdoer was held liable for damages could shift his entire loss to the wrongdoer
who, in fact, had caused the harm. Indemnity has been defined as "a right which inures to a
person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which, as between himself and
another, should have been discharged by the other." 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 1. See also
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 51, at 310: "There is an important distinction between contri-
bution, which distributes the loss among the tortfeasors by requiring each to pay his propor-
tionate share, and indemnity, which shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been
compelled to pay it to the shoulders of another who should bear it instead."
54. E.g., Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Indem-
nity has also been allowed where the owner of various forms of property was initially held
liable for the negligent acts of another. GACL, Inc. v. Riviera Tile and Terrazzo Co., 300 So.
2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (owner of apartment complex sought indemnity against tile com-
pany that installed soap dish that shattered, causing injuries to tenant); St. Vincent's Hosp.,
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plied indemnity from his employee who negligently injured the
plaintiff, if the liability of the employer derived entirely from his
status as employer.8 8 Such imputed liability, variously labelled as
constructive or derivative, 6 secondary, 7 vicarious or technical, or
passive" liability or negligence, corresponds exactly with the sec-
ond category in our discussion of liability 0 and the concept of legal
fault."1
Inc. v. Crouch, 292 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (indemnity action by hospital against
subcontractor for damages paid to wife of patient who had been injured on pile of building
material left in hospital parking lot after visiting husband); Olin's Rent-A-Car System, Inc.
v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (hotel entitled to
indemnity from auto rental company that did business at hotel and provided services for
hotel); State Road Dep't v. Cuyahoga Wrecking Co., 171 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965)
(contractor who demolished and removed building prior to condemnation entitled to indem-
nification from road department); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (indemnity action by store owner against elevator maintenance
company for damages paid to injured shopper).
55. E.g., Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (power
company sought indemnity from canal authority for damages paid to employee injured
while measuring distance between ground and high-voltage transmission line).
56. See cases cited note 54 supra.
57. E.g., Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (surgeon, held
liable to patient, sought indemnity from hospital and from assistant furnished by hospital);
see Walkowiak, supra note 16, at 524-27 (discussion of primary and secondary liability in
Maybarduk in terms of the duties owed among the various parties).
58. E.g., American Home Assur. Co. v. City of Opa Locka, 368 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979).
59. Passive negligence was originally used to denote vicarious, technical or constructive
liability where the party failed to act and was liable because of the actions of another. Sub-
sequently the active/passive terminology became a catch-all for approximating contribution.
See note 52 supra. At the core of such actions, however, lie situations called passive but
more accurately described by one of the other concepts in indemnity. In Florida Power &
Light Co. v. General Safety Equip. Co., 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), the court af-
firmed dismissal of a third party action by the power company for indemnity because the
complaint alleged active negligence on the part of the defendant. In so ruling, the court
stated that passive liability could exist which would entitle the defendant to indemnity if it
were in fact vicariously or technically liable:
Although in defining negligence, omission to act is frequently referred to as pas-
sive negligence, it does not follow that it is entitled to be so classified in contem-
plation of the rule regarding indemnification . . . . The difference here is that
the liability of the power company, if established on the allegations of negligence
in the complaint, would not be a vicarious or technical liability arising from tort
of another, but its liability would result from its active negligence through its
failure or omission to act as required under certain circumstances.
Id. at 488.
60. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
61. The concept of "fault" in indemnity in Florida arises from four different sources.
First, it may arise from the traditional indemnity situations involving a vicarious relation-
ship where fault includes both legally imputed fault (legal fault) and actual negligence (cul-
pable fault). Cases arising under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine involving cars, al-
though now a statutory form of strict liability, fall properly into the first category because
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Second, a court might find that even a negligent party should
receive indemnification from another whose acts were more culpa-
ble than the acts of the indemnitee. Thus, a court would require a
supplier of goods to indemnify a retailer or user of the goods who
negligently relied upon the supplier's representations of proper
care of the goods. 2 Similarly, the owner of a building who negli-
gently relied upon a contractor who made improvements or repairs
would have a right to indemnity.6 In products cases, a manufac-
turer who negligently failed to discover a defective component
could recover through implied indemnity from the manufacturer of
the component." In each case, the indemnitor could more easily
have performed the necessary inspection and correction of defects
than the indemnitee could. Focusing on the indemnitor's conduct
as the breach of a duty owed by one defendant to the other, courts
before Houdaille commonly distinguished between the active neg-
they do not involve the sharing of the costs as in the manufacture of a product. Further,
unlike the strict (statutory) liability of the dogbite cases, a third individual is in-
volved-presumably one is more responsible for control of one's dog than for the behavior of
the negligent driver of one's car. See cases cited note 29 supra.
Second, indemnity actions occur in the specialized field of admiralty law. The principles
of vicarious liability and strict liability are both present in maritime indemnity, which will
not be discussed separately. See note 51 supra.
Third, some actions involve the fault embodied in strict liability although variously
characterized either incorrectly as liability without fault or correctly as negligence per se.
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). See generally J. ALPERT, supra
note 29; Jensvold, supra note 26; Kissel, Contribution or Indemnification Among Strictly
Liable Defendants, 16 FOR THE DEFENSE 133 (1975); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse:
An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403
(1978); Wade, supra note 23.
Fourth, and most recently, the concept arises from the use of the term "fault" in contri-
bution and comparative actions. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1979).
62. E.g., Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Compare
cases cited note 51 supra, with Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Dan Graves Masonry, Inc., 37
Fla. Supp. 139 (Pinellas County Cir. Ct. 1971). See also Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co.,
378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); Mallory S.S. Co. v. Druhan, 17 Ala. App. 465, 84 So. 874 (1920);
Boston Woven-hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901); Busch &
Latta Paint Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276 S.W. 614 (1925); John
Wanamaker, N.Y., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718 (1920).
63. See cases cited note 54 supra.
64. E.g., Tromza v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 378 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1967); McDonald v.
Blue Jeans Corp., 183 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Jensvold argues that
[s]ince each defendant is liable only if the product was in a defective condition
at the time it left his possession, the ultimate responsibility should rest upon the
one who first placed the defective product into the stream of commerce. Thus, it
follows that if a product is defective only because one of its component parts is
defective, the ultimate responsibility for injuries caused by the product is im-
posed upon the manufacturer of the component part.
Jensvold, supra note 26, at 730.
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ligence of the indemnitor and the passive negligence of the indem-
nitee." Behavior of this sort would generally fall within the first
and third categories of liability discussed above (the breach of a
duty of care, and strict liability for the creation of a risk of harm to
another, respectively), but is by no means coterminous with them
or with the broader concept of culpable fault."
In the third approach, the courts developed implied indemnity
as a substitute for contribution. 7 The early common law had re-
65. E.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963), modi-
fied, 160 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1964) (grocery store owner sought indemnity from bottling com-
pany which had negligently constructed bottle display causing injuries to customer). In Flor-
ida Power & Light Co. v. Hercules Concrete Pile Co., 275 F. Supp. 427, 429 (S.D. Fla. 1967),
the court stated: "Under this principle one who is considered a 'passive' tortfeasor may
recover indemnity from a so-called 'active' tortfeasor, the measure of damages being the
recovery which the injured party received from the passive tortfeasor." See also People Gas
Sys., Inc. v. B & P Rest. Corp., 271 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Stembler v. Smith, 242
So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970); Florida Power & Light Co. v. General Safety Equip. Co., 213
So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d 211
(Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
66. The concepts of culpable and legal fault merged with the concepts of active and
passive negligence in the leading case of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45
(Fla. 1st DCA 1963). There, the court denied an indemnity action on the ground that the
failure of the storeowner to correct a dangerous bottle display arranged by the bottling com-
pany was primary and active negligence of the same degree for which the bottling company
was liable. Id. at 51. One unintended consequence of the Winn-Dixie opinion was to shift
the focus from the relation and duty owed between the two defendants to the relation and
duty owed by both the defendants to the injured party. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Thompson Aircraft Tire Co., 353 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (whether a party is
actively or passively negligent is for the trier of fact to decide); Florida Power Corp. v.
Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (indemnity applies not only in the context of
vicarious liability but also in any case involving two tortfeasors, one actively and the other
passively negligent).
Davis offers this justification:
[Niegligent tortfeasors who breach different qualities of duties toward an injured
person can be considered to be on different 'planes of fault'- which difference is
important enough to warrant a complete shifting of the loss from one to the
other. But tortfeasors who breach substantially equal duties are on the same
"plane of fault" and should share the loss.
Davis, supra note 51, at 547 (emphasis in original).
67. Prior to adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1975, in-
demnity was viewed as a means of alleviating what was increasingly perceived as the unjust
enrichment caused by prohibiting contribution. See generally Davis, supra note 51; Ferrini,
The Evolution from Indemnity to Contribution-A Question of the Future, if Any, of In-
demnity, 58 CH. BAR REc. 254 (1978).
The "active/passive" distinction, in particular, lent itself to expanding the concept of
indemnity by suggesting that the degrees of negligence of the defendant tortfeasors be
weighed in determining which one was to bear the loss. See Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So.
2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), rev'd, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977), where the court stated: "Apart
from the existence of an express contract to indemnify, indemnity has been permitted when
it is predicated upon the existence and violation of a duty as between the tortfeasors . ..
and likewise where it has been predicated upon the degrees of wrongful conduct as between
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jected contribution, the apportionment of loss among the parties
liable for the plaintiff's injuries. 8 Courts expanded the scope of
implied indemnity by resorting to the distinction between active
and passive negligence or finding the parties not in pari delicto 9
Because a tortfeasor without a right of contribution must sustain
the entire loss caused jointly by himself and others, courts often
weighed the degrees of negligence of the tortfeasors to determine
which party should bear the loss. As one court observed, indemnity
could ameliorate the rule against contribution among tortfeasors
"where the facts shown make it unequitable that the principal
wrongdoer should escape liability. 70 Behavior susceptible to this
approach also falls within the first and third categories of liability
and involves culpable fault.7
1
the tortfeasors .... " Id. at 191 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
68. E.g., Jacksonville Coach Co. v. Royal, 97 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1957); Jackson v. Florida
Weathermakers, Inc., 55 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1951); Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142
Fla. 27, 195 So. 353 (1940); H.G. Wolfe Constr. Co. v. Ellison, 127 Fla. 808, 174 So. 594
(1936).
69. Generally, the terms were used in combination with each other. Not "in pari
delicto" means not in equal fault. See Davissupra note 51; Kissel, supra note 61.
70. Stahlberg v. Hannifin Corp., 157 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1957).
Even after adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act and the subsequent comparative
fault amendment, see note 5 supra, the lower courts viewed indemnity as a means of ex-
tending contribution to two areas not covered by the Act: situations involving statutory
limits of the Workers' Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. § 440.01-.60 (1979), and situations in-
volving successive tortfeasors. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
In Stuart, the supreme court quashed the decision of the court of appeals and held that
an initial tortfeasor could not seek indemnity from a successive tortfeasor who aggravated
the injuries of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that to espouse a hybrid doctrine of partial
equitable indemnification would lead to confusion and nonuniformity of application by the
lower courts. Id. at 706. Although the court had found in Trail Buildings Supply Co. v.
Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1970), that a manufacturer had a right of indemnity against an
employer of an injured employee, the court limited that right in Seaboard Coast Line R.R.
v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978) and virtually eliminated that right in Houdaille Indus.,
Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979). In Houdaille, the court determined that indem-
nity, unlike contribution, does not permit a weighing of the relative degrees of fault. Id. at
493. The court returned to viewing the relationship between the defendants as the critical
one in determining whether indemnity would be allowed. If, as between the defendants, the
one seeking indemnity is without fault, indemnity is allowed. Id.
Subsection (3)(a) of FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979) reads in part: "Pro rata shares. In deter-
mining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) Their relative degrees of
fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability." With the adoption of subsection (3)(a) in
1976, Florida became a pure comparative negligence state. Under the 1975 Act, Florida was
a comparative negligence state permitting contribution on a pro rata basis determined by
the number of defendants. If there were three defendants, for example, each would be liable
for one-third of the damages. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). See note 5
supra.
71. The inclusion of both legal liability and negligence in the term "fault" is found in
the early case of Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330,
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C. Implied Indemnity, Contribution, and Fault After Houdaille
In Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards,72 the court faced the
question whether a manufacturer sued for breach of warranty may
bring a third party suit for indemnity against the employer of the
injured party. Edwards, an employee of Houdaille Industries, was
killed when a steel cable used in the manufacture of concrete
beams broke while being stretched through a beam mold.
Houdaille paid workers' compensation benefits to Edwards' survi-
vors. Edwards' personal representative then sued the manufacturer
of the steel cable, Florida Wire, for wrongful death, alleging that
Florida Wire had breached an implied warranty of fitness by pro-
viding a defective cable. Florida Wire, barred by the workers' com-
pensation statute from bringing an action for contribution against
the employer of the injured worker,73 filed a third party indemnity
action against Houdaille, alleging that if Florida Wire were negli-
gent, its negligence was merely passive, while that of Houdaille was
active.7 4 Under the traditional tests for implied indemnity, passive
negligence would have provided a valid basis for recovery. 75
Houdaille moved for summary judgment on the third party ac-
tion, arguing that breach of implied warranty involved active negli-
gence by definition.7 6 In response, Florida Wire contended that
breach of warranty is a form of liability which does not involve
actual fault or active negligence on the part of the manufacturer. 7
143 So. 316 (1932) (en banc). The court stated:
Generally, one of two joint tortfeasors cannot have contribution from the
other. But there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is in that class of cases
where although both parties are at fault and both liable to the person injured,
such as an employee of one of them, yet, they are not in pari delicto as to each
other, as where the injury has resulted from a violation of th6 duty which one
owes the other, so that as between themselves, the act or omission of the one
from whom indemnity is sought is the primary cause of the injury.
Id. at 332 (emphasis in original). This definition of fault as including both legal and moral
fault, was the commonly accepted definition of fault in indemnity. Maybarduk v. Busta-
mante, 294 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So.
2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
72. 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
73. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1979).
74. Id. Specifically, Florida Wire alleged that Houdaille failed to conduct the detension-
ing process properly, did not properly insert a strand back in the jack used in the detension-
ing process, improperly installed the jack to the strand of wire which resulted in misalign-
ment of the jack and subsequent release of the strand, and did not properly instruct its
employees about the detensioning process.
75. See note 59 supra.
76. Home Indemnity Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), rev'd,
374 So. 2d 490 (1979).
77. See id. at 1114.
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The trial court agreed with Houdaille and dismissed the third
party complaint.78 On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, reversed, holding that a manufacturer of a product is enti-
tled to bring an action in implied indemnity against an employer
who has, through active misuse of the product, caused injuries to
its employee.7 Houdaille sought conflict certiorari in the Supreme
Court of Florida, which reversed.80
The supreme court decided that the manufacturer had no
right to indemnity from the employer, "absent a special relation-
ship between the manufacturer and the employer which would
make the manufacturer only vicariously, constructively, deriva-
tively, or technically liable for the wrongful acts of the em-
ployer."81 The court suggested that the district court had improp-
erly used the traditional indemnity concepts of active and passive
negligence by weighing the fault of the manufacturer against the
fault of the employer. In the context of implied indemnity, the
court said, these terms mean nothing more than fault or no fault.8 '
In applying this test, the court held that it is improper to weigh
the relative fault of the parties."8 The court assumed that liability
under an implied warranty involves some fault,8 4 so that a third
party indemnity action will not lie against an employer even
though he may also be at fault.
V. THE MEANING OF FAULT
The supreme court's use of the term "no fault" in Houdaille is
inconsistent with its use of "fault" to include both legal and culpa-
ble fault. It is logically inconsistent for the indemnitee to be liable
to the plaintiff (hence at fault) but entitled to implied indemnity
(hence not at fault). If, however, "no fault" includes legal fault,
then the Houdaille decision is consistent with the term "fault" de-
78. 374 So. 2d at 492.
79. 360 So. 2d at 1114-15.
80. 374 So. 2d at 494. The district court decision conflicted with Stuart v. Hertz Corp.,
351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977), and with Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Co. v. Charles Poe
Masonry, Inc., 358 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). For a discussion of the supreme court's
revised conflict jurisdiction, see Kramer, Halpern & Robbins, Constitutonal Law, 1979 De-
velopments in Florida Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 597, 615-19 (1980).
81. 374 So. 2d at 492. Until the Houdaille decision, a manufacturer could argue it was
entitled to indemnity from an employer when the manufacturer's negligence was passive as
compared to the active negligence of the employer. See Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan,
235 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1970); note 76 supra.
82. 374 So. 2d at 493.
83. Id.
84. Id. The appellate court had rejected this assumption. 360 So. 2d at 1114.
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fined as culpable fault. Florida courts maintain conceptual consis-
tency by deeming strict liability and breach of implied warranty to
encompass instances of both culpable and legal fault.
The Houdaille court stated that implied indemnity is availa-
ble only to a party who is without fault and thus only vicariously
or technically liable. 5 These implicate areas traditionally de-
scribed as legal fault. Thus, actions described in those terms are
preserved, and "no fault," as used in Houdaille, must equal or in-
clude "legal fault." s
The court also ruled that a manufacturer allegedly having
breached an implied warranty cannot bring an indemnity action
against an employer, without pleading the existence of a special
relationship between itself and the employer which would make
the manufacturer only vicariously, constructively, or technically li-
able. Such a relationship is necessary because the plaintiff's action
against the manufacturer under an implied warranty is based upon
the fault of the manufacturer.8 7 Hence, a recovery by the plaintiff
upon the theory of breach of implied warranty on the facts before
the court in Houdaille would preclude the finding of no fault in
the conduct of the manufacturer and thus prevent implied
indemnity.
At the same time, the court specifically recognized that the
liability of a manufacturer who sells a product containing a defec-
tive component manufactured by another may be without fault.8
The manufacturer of the product who fails to discover the defec-
85. 374 So. 2d at 492, 493.
86. "No fault" may include more than legal fault. The court specifically included failure
to discover a defective component in "no fault." Failure to discover has traditionally in-
cluded both negligence and strict liability. If logical analysis cannot separate these elements,
this "no fault" would include more than "legal fault." See note 87 and accompanying text
infra. Thus, the plaintiff has some control over the third party action for implied indemnity.
If the plaintiff is injured in an automobile accident, he may sue the owner of the other car.
If his complaint states a cause of action against the owner based solely on ownership, then
the owner may bring an indemnity action against the driver of the car. If the plaintiff sues
the owner for negligent entrustment, then the defendant will have a cause of action for
indemnity which is contingent upon the finding of the trier of fact that he was, in fact, not
negligent. Most plaintiffs will plead as many theories as possible; hence, plaintiffs control
will be minimal.
87. Thus, the court states that it is concerned only with the fault or no fault of the
party seeking indemnity. 374 So. 2d at 493. Florida Wire's claim that Edwards' death re-
sulted solely from the negligence of Houdaille is viewed as a complete defense to the origi-
nal action, but irrelevant in the indemnity action. Id. If Florida Wire is liable, it can only be
so because it was found at fault-that is, a defect in its product had some causal relation to
the death of Edwards. Id. at 494.
88. Id. at 493 n.3.
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tive component may plead implied indemnity because failure to
discover a defective component gives rise to liability without fault.
By not permitting a cause of action in implied indemnity for
breach of warranty in Houdaille but allowing it against a compo-
nent manufacturer, the court in effect distinguishes actions for
breach of implied warranty from those for strict liability based on
the original concept of passive negligence; where the manufacturer
is held liable for the affirmative actions of another, implied indem-
nity may lie."' But where the manufacturer's product contains a
defect for which he is responsible, he may not plead implied
indemnity.90
Thus, culpable fault inheres in the manufacture of an alleg-
edly defective product that causes injury to another. If the defect
results from a component manufactured by another, however, and
the manufacturer of the product merely failed to discover the de-
fect, the manufacturer's actions are then "without fault." If the
breach of a duty owed to the manufacturer by a component sup-
plier created the liability of the manufacturer, the manufacturer's
liability involves no fault, and indemnity will lie. This analysis, in
89. Id.
90. Id. at 493. It follows that a retailer who would be found at fault under a theory of
negligence per se in strict liability and implied warranty would still have a right to indem-
nity (from a manufacturer) if he could allege he was only derivatively or technically lia-
ble-that is, that his fault was really no fault because all he did was sell the product as
agent for the manufacturer. 374 So. 2d at 493. See also Jensvold, supra note 26; Walkowiak,
supra note 16. As agent, the retailer carried out the duties owed under such implied agency
in a manner without fault and unrelated to the cause of the injury.
Similarly, the court suggested that a manufacturer who incorporates a defective compo-
nent into his own product could, under certain circumstances, be without fault in its rela-
tionship to the supplier of the component part. 374 So. 2d at 493 n.3. Even though a manu-
facturer would be negligent per se and at fault under strict liability, in this case a
manufacturer would act as the agent of the party who produced the defective part. If the
manufacturer pled that it had carried out its duties to the supplier by installing the part
without fault and was therefore only technically liable, it could seek indemnity against the
supplier. In returning to the traditional definition of indemnity based on duties between
tortfeasors, the court is really returning to the implied contract basis for indemnity and the
notion of an implied warranty of performance. The court in Houdaille states that "[t]he
user of an item supplied by another, in the absence of a contract, does not owe the latter
any duty of care in connection with the use of the item so as to create a duty upon the user
to indemnify the supplier." Id. at 494. Thus, Florida Wire, or any manufacturer of a defec-
tive part, could not seek indemnity from a user of the product. But if the court finds an
implied contract, Florida Wire or a supplier might have to indemnify the manufacturer who
used the component part. This "agency no-fault" claim to indemnity could not be asserted
by one who actually manufactured the defective part.
It appears that Florida has adopted a standard of comparative causation in the area of
products liability. See Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
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keeping with the original concept of "passive negligence," leads to
the conclusion that in effect the court has defined "fault" to in-
clude culpable fault only, and "no fault" to include only legal fault.
VI. PLEADING IMPLIED INDEMNITY
The reasoning in Houdaille suggests that the court has limited
the use of implied indemnity by preventing a trial court from using
the active-passive dichotomy to allow a culpably liable party to
shift the loss allocated to him to another more culpable party. Par-
tial reallocation of loss among culpable parties may be accom-
plished only through comparative negligence and contribution.
After Houdaille, then, a third party action for implied indem-
nity will survive a motion to dismiss only by satisfying the follow-
ing criteria:
A. The plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action against
the indemnitee based at least in part on imputed liability; and
B. The third party complaint alleges:
1. there existed a special duty running from the indemnitor
to the indemnitee;
2. the indemnitor breached his special duty to the indem-
nitee;
3. the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the same actions
which breached the indemnitor's duty to the indemnitee; and
4. the indemnitee can be held liable to the plaintiff for the
injuries to the plaintiff resulting from the indemnitor's acts.
If the courts consistently interpret prior case law and the
Houdaille decision, implied indemnity will still be allowed in the
following major areas:9"
A. Respondeat superior (e.g., implied indemnity from the em-
ployee to the employer);
91. In each of these cases, a court may establish a defendant's liability, then impute
that liability to the real party at fault whose breach of a special duty to the defendant
actually caused the plaintiff's injuries. A particularly interesting example is the rule of resti-
tution that allows an agent to obtain indemnity from his principal when the agent, acting in
reliance upon and at the direction of his principal, has done an authorized act that creates
liability for both the agent and the principal. If the agent's reliance upon the directions of
his principal was justifiable and in good faith, the court will allow indemnity against the
principal. See note 90 supra. See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 90 (1937); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439 (1958).
The Supreme Court of Florida recognized such a right of indemnity in Croom v. Swann,
1 Fla. 211 (1847). More recently, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, allowed a
similar right of indemnity in Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stevenson, 370 So. 2d 1211 (Fla.
2d DCA 1979). See note 10 supra.
[Vol. 34:727
INDEMNITY AFTER HOUDAILLE
B. Agency relationship (e.g., implied indemnity from principal
to agent who, in good faith, acted in an authorized manner);
C. Ownership of dangerous instrumentalities (e.g., implied in-
demnity from a driver or bailee for hire to the owner of the
automobile);
D. Strict liability or breach of implied warranty (e.g., implied
indemnity from the manufacturer of a defective product to a re-
tailer who fails to discover a hidden defect; from the manufac-
turer of a component with a hidden defect to the manufacturer
of a product using that component who fails to discover the
defect);
E. Ownership of land (e.g., implied indemnity to an owner
from a lessee who created a dangerous condition); and
F. Statutorily created duties (e.g., implied indemnity from a
negligent connecting carrier to a common carrier).
If the plaintiff's recovery is based in any way on the culpable con-
duct of the indemnitee, so that the indemnitee cannot be held lia-
ble solely on the grounds of his legal fault, then no cause of action
for implied indemnity will lie against a party culpably at fault. The
defendant must then depend on comparative negligence or contri-
bution for his remedy against the other culpable parties involved
in the accident.
VII. Loss DISTRIBUTION AND EQUITY
The Houdaille decision narrows the scope of implied indem-
nity in precluding parties culpably at fault from escaping liability
by shifting the loss to more culpable parties. Although the decision
preserves a certain conceptual consistency (in restricting indem-
nity to indemnitees free from fault), the consistency comes at the
expense of justice. Narrowing indemnity will lead to inequity in
some cases by allowing the unjust enrichment of negligent employ-
ers. Equity begins with the idea of doing justice, irrespective of
technicalities. Since equity provides the basis for loss distribution
in tort law, larger concerns than the narrow concept of fault should
guide the courts in formulating rules for the allocation of losses.
A. Models of Accident Law
Three models based on three goals and three decision rules
offer a framework for evaluating changes in accident law.2 The
92. The suggestive outlines of the three models may be found in Fletcher, supra note
14, at 538. Professor Fletcher correctly recognizes that the law has changed from a concept
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fault model pairs the goal of allocating loss to the wrongdoer"3 with
a decision rule based on fault. The compensation model pairs the
goal of compensating the injured party94 with a decision rule based
on immediate and complete compensation. The third model, the
economic allocation of resources, pairs the goal of minimizing the
cost of accidents to the economy 5 with a decision rule based on
of fault based on individual autonomy and responsibility for one's own actions, to one which
combines that concept with policy concerns for compensating the victim of an accident fully
and rapidly, and making enterprises bear their own costs. Professor Fletcher defines a "par-
adigm of reciprocity" based on the concept of fault defined as the creation of nonreciprocal
risks and contrasts that paradigm with a "paradigm of reasonableness" which assigns liabil-
ity instrumentally on the basis of a utilitarian calculus of social concerns. Professor Fletcher
views the mid-19th century transition from a simple definition of liability based on fault as
nonreciprocal risk creation to a complex social policy definition, to be a "revolutionary"
change from one paradigm to another. See KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLU-
TIONS (2d ed. 1970). Professor Fletcher fails to recognize, however, that his paradigm of
reciprocity assumes a social policy-allocation of loss according to risk creation-and is
therefore a model under the general paradigm of reasonableness. The 19th century change
referred to by Professor Fletcher did not introduce a new paradigm with the sudden discon-
tinuity which characterizes the total reorganization of scientific thought after a paradigm
shift. Rather, the change expanded the concept of the law to include social policies other
than allocation of loss according to risk creation and compensation. The result was that
other concerns, such as complete compensation of the victim and minimization of economic
costs, may now be considered in determining loss allocation. Nevertheless, Professor Fletch-
er has contributed to our concept of fault and to the fault model of accident law. His con-
cept of fault as risk creation represents a recurring theme in this article. See also Calabresi,
supra note 1.
93. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 3, at 16; Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives
on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964);
Fletcher, supra note 14, at 538. For a vitriolic and destructive analysis of Blum and
Kalven's version of the fault model, see Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful
World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216, 221-22 (1965).
94. Prosser declares that the miscellaneous wrongs included under the head of torts:
have little in common and appear at first glance to be entirely unrelated to one
another, except perhaps by the accident of historical development; and it is not
easy todiscover any general principle upon which they may all be based, unless
it is the obvious one that injuries are to be compensated, and anti-social behav-
ior is to be discouraged.
W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 1, at 3.
See generally G. REJDA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (1976). For a rejec-
tion of this goal and its model, see Blum and Kalven, supra note 93, at 37-38, 41-43. Cala-
bresi has referred to this goal as "risk spreading" because the ultimate form of the goal is
social insurance for all accidents. See Calabresi, supra note 93, at 218-19.
95. See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 713; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). The same general ideas may also be found in
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITH-
OUT FAULT (1951), reprinted in 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422 (1966); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS
9-14 (3d ed. 1965); Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident
Costs? 33 LAW CONTEMP. PROB. 429 (1968); Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Soci-
ety, 56 TEX. L. REV. 519 (1978); Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 401 (1959); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J.
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the efficient, economic allocation of resources.
A thorough, reliable evaluation of changes in the law must
take into account the potential conflicts among evaluations based
on each of the three different models. ' It is possible to resolve
conflicts among the models by eliminating one or more of the mod-
els from consideration, or by weighting the evaluations made by
the models so that one goal is favored over the others. These are
political rather than legal decisions, which must weaken the valid-
ity of the observer's conclusions. Fortunately, a legal resolution of
the problem is possible in two situations. First, if one or more of
the models favors change in the law and none disfavors it, then the
analytical framework supports making the change in the law. Con-
versely, if one or more of the models disfavors change in the law
and none favors it, the change in the law should not be made. 7
This is the approach adopted here.
The Fault Model. The fault model seeks to place the loss on
the risk creator or party at fault.9 8 Each finder of fact defines fault,
limited only by the jury instructions or the finder's own knowledge
of the law.99 Logically, when more than one party is at fault, the
cost to each (his penalty) should be proportional to his fault.10 0
Thus, the decision rule of the fault model may be stated: does the
change in the law lead to a more precise allocation of the cost ac-
1172 (1952); Walkowiak, supra note 16.
96. The fundamental tenet of economic models is that a misallocation of risk and loss
results in an overall decrease in economic efficiency. Since the goal of accident law is the
minimization of total accident costs, not minimization of accidents, a correct allocation of
resources is essential to minimization of accident costs. Calabresi, supra note 93.
See the extensive debate over the deterrent effect of fault-based liability in automobile
no-fault insurance, as reflected in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH ...
(1967); PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: THE KEETON-O'CONNELL PLAN AND ITS CRITIcS
(E. Shapiro, R. Needham & J. Feldman, ads. 1967); Knepper, Alimony for Accident Vic-
tims? 15 DEFENSE L.J. 513 (1966); O'Connell, Is It Really Immoral to Pay Regardless of
Fault? TRIAL, November/December 1967, at 18.
97. Suppose that the fault model, applied to the law before and after the Houdaille
decision, showed that the law has moved away from the goal of allocating loss to the wrong-
doers. The decision rule for the fault model would disfavor the change. Suppose, further,
that the decision rules for the compensation and allocation of cost models showed no
change. That would suggest that the Houdaille decision was correct because it moved the
law toward one goal while leaving the other two goals unaffected. Conversely, if one decision
rule showed a positive change and another showed a negative change, then there would be
no way to decide whether the Houdaille decision was correct unless the observer picked one
model over the others.
98. Fletcher, supra note 14, at 550.
99. See notes 40 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
100. This is the basis for comparative negligence, contribution, and implied indemnity.
See notes 33 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
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cording to the relative fault of the parties?
The Compensation Model. The goal of the compensation
model is full compensation for the injured party.1' 1 Not directly
concerned with the risk creator, this model views the identifying
and penalizing of the parties at fault as a barrier to full compensa-
tion.102 The compensation model rests on the assumption that
compensation from the most reliable source should be immediate
and automatic, not dependent on establishing a threshold of
fault.103 Thus, the decision rule for the compensation model may
be stated: Does the change provide immediate and complete com-
pensation for all injuries?
The Economic Allocation of Resources Model. This model is
seeks to prevent accidents from distorting the allocation of re-
sources in a quasi-free market economy. 04 The proper allocation of
resources will occur if the cost of injuries is borne by the enter-
prises' 05 "involved"' 0 6 in the accident. 0 7 Among the parties thus
101. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 4, at 17; Calabresi, supra note 1, at 713; Fletcher,
supra note 14, at 537.
102. Walkowiak, supra note 16, at 540-42.
103. Calabresi has referred to the compensation goal as "risk spreading," which has as
its ultimate goal "social insurance." Calabresi, supra note 93, at 218. This means that com-
pensation of all victims may best take place where there are no barriers to compensation.
This will occur only when the compensation is immediate and automatic, necessarily requir-
ing that no parties have an interest in avoiding payment. The only possible mechanism for
achieving this goal would be insurance across all parts of society, administered by the gov-
ernment or some quasi-governmental agency. Hence, the concern for the reduction of all
barriers and the movement away from the tort system.
104. The goal of this model is to reduce accident costs. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 713.
105. Despite the crucial position of "enterprise" in the resource allocation model, the
word is never defined precisely. Calabresi, for example, loosely defines "enterprise liability"
as the notion that losses should be borne by the doer, the enterprise, rather than distributed
on the basis of fault .. " Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500 (1961). Thus, "enterprise" refers to a doer-one who engages in
economic activity for profit. Put this way, any corporation or individual is an enterprise,
since the worker no less than the employer is engaged in the sale of a commodity (labor) for
profit.
106. "Involvement" is another important concept which is generally left to our imagina-
tion and inductive reasoning. Calabresi clearly means to leave the concept vague and puts
quotation marks around the term to show its special, but undefined, qualities. See Cala-
bresi, supra note 1, at 739-42. Calabresi suggests: "In other words, 'involvement' is a term of
art designed to include all those factors that are part of an accident and may be replaced by
substitutes with a substantially different accident potential." Id. at 742. Calabresi attempts
to keep the concept general enough so that it will not always require case-by-case analysis:
I do not mean that such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.
That question is entirely a matter of the costs involved. There might be some
contexts in which a case-by-case determination of what activities are involved
and what are not may be worth the extreme cost of such determinations. In
other areas guidelines of general applicability as to involvement might do nearly
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identified, the initial burden should fall on the party most likely to
include the accident cost in the price of whatever the enterprise
sells.10 8 The enterprise should be the smallest economic production
unit involved in the loss and identifiable without excessive secon-
dary cost. 09 Alternatively, the initial burden should fall on the
party best informed of the costs of the accident (i.e., with the high-
est risk awareness), 10 best able to insure against the loss or dis-
tribute it most cheaply to other enterprises or other parties in the
same enterprise (the factor of loss distribution),"' and least likely
to place part or all of the cost on a party outside the enterprises
as good a job of excluding irrelevant activities and the fact that they do it muoh
more cheaply than the case-by-case approach would be conclusive.
Id. n.43. This approach seems wise, given the general lack of detailed parameters available
for model construction. Nevertheless, it is clear that the term is strikingly similar to "causa-
tion" in fault developing under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See
Twerski, supra note 61. This raises an interesting question: If fault means causation and an
enterprise is involved if it helps cause the accident, are the fault and allocation of resources
models really very different from each other?
107. If an enterprise involved in the accident bears no part of the accident's cost, then
the cost of the product sold by the enterprise need not increase to bear that burden. As a
result, more of the product will be bought and more will be produced than would have been
the case if the accident cost had been correctly apportioned. This leads to more resources
being allocated to this enterprise and fewer resources being allocated to the enterprise
forced to bear the cost of the accident. Since the fundamental assumption of the market
model of economics is that, all things being equal, the market mechanisms of supply and
demand most efficiently allocate resources, it logically follows that an enterprise should bear
the costs of the injuries it causes. Obviously, as noted above, the model of economic alloca-
tion of resources assumes that accidents should be viewed as costs and that the goal of the
system should be allocation of resources to minimize economic costs, rather than the elimi-
nation of all accidents. See generally Calabresi, supra note 1, at 717-18.
108. This follows logically from the supply and demand theory stated above. If an en-
terprise's prices cannot reflect the cost of an accident, then that cost will not affect demand
or supply. Id.
109. Id. at 733-34. If an enterprise is not differentiated from another, and only one is
involved in the accident, then the uninvolved one will bear costs not incidental to its enter-
prise; hence, resources will be misallocated.
110. Id. at 729. The idea here is that the loss should be placed on the enterprise which
has better access to information regarding the ultimate costs of the accident and therefore
can better make the decision to avoid the accident. Thus, if workers are so disorganized that
they never have sufficient information to determine whether or how it is in their best inter-
est to take steps to avoid injuries, then the loss should be placed on the employer who
presumably keeps statistics and ledgers concerning employee injuries and can place protec-
tive devices on the machines to avoid accidents.
111. Id. at 727-29. If the employer can fix the machine to avoid accidents or pay the
workers more for the privilege of injuring them and include that cost in his enterprise's
production costs, whereas the employees must strike to force higher wages or better working
conditions, then the loss should be placed initially on the employer. He would then dis-
tribute it to his workers and the other enterprises involved in the accident. It has generally
been assumed that the employer has better knowledge and ability to distribute the risk and
loss than his employees. This argument is questionable, if the employees are unionized.
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involved in the accident (non-externalization)." 2 When two or
more enterprises are involved in the accident and cannot be
treated as one enterprise or distinguished according to the criteria
set forth above, the best rule is to distribute the loss on a pro rata
basis." 8
In many cases, there is no general answer to the questions
posed, aside from the number of enterprises "involved." Often,
logic alone cannot determine which enterprise should bear the ini-
tial burden of the accident."' That determination requires an em-
pirical study of the extent to which each party or enterprise meets
the criteria of risk awareness, loss distribution, and non-externali-
zation. Thus, the decision rule for the allocation of resources model
may be stated as a series of questions:
1) How many enterprises can be identified?
2) How many of those enterprises are "involved"?
3) Which enterprises or parties best exemplify the goals of (a)
risk awareness, (b) loss distribution, and (c) non-externalization?
4) If the answers to 3) are unknown, is the initial cost allo-
cated on a pro rata basis among the enterprises "involved" in the
112. Id. Insurance is a mechanism for externalizing the costs. The employer has
worker's compensation and tort liability insurance; the employee has workers' compensation
and accident insurance of his own. The insurance company gambles that this employee will
not be injured unless and until he has paid enough premiums to cover his potential injuries.
If the worker pays less than his injuries, then the insurance company loses on this particular
individual. The insurance company, however, insures many workers, some of whom will
never be injured on the job. In the economic sense, these other workers help pay the cost of
the employee's injuries. The economic activities of the employees who are not injured must
bear some of the cost (the premiums they pay) of an injured employee's accident. The vari-
ous enterprises of injured employees do not bear their correct share of the economic loss,
thus misallocating resources. The same analysis may be applied to other enterprises vis-a-vis
the employer's enterprise. Insurance therefore tends to cause the system to run less effi-
ciently. Once again, however, this variable has no real significance. Labor, employers, and
manufacturers all tend to have insurance and externalize the loss. There is nothing wrong
with insurance on a macro scale as long as the loss is kept within the same industry. Major
disruptions arise when the loss is allocated by insurance or the law to enterprises which, as a
class, should not bear the loss. Id.
113. Id. at 740. In short, if an enterprise is involved in an accident, then some economic
pressure should help the parties engaged in that enterprise focus their attention on the
problem, leading to a more rapid and efficient distribution of loss and to a decision for or
against having accidents.
114. Id. at 732. Because these concepts are generally empirical, no absolute rule of lia-
bility can be established for each situation. For instance, an employer may be in no better
position than an employee to reduce cost and spread risk, as where the employee is a mem-
ber of a large union and the employer is only a small operation. Id. at 728 n.22. Each factual
situation must be analyzed on its own terms before the economic burden of liability can be
properly placed.
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accident?"11
B. Application of the Models to the Workers' Compensation
Problem Before Houdaille" 6
The three models of loss allocation provide a means of evalu-
ating the law before and after Houdaille in terms of the relation-
ships among an injured employee, his employer, and the manufac-
turer of a product the employee was using when he was injured.
Consider the following hypothetical. An employee suffers an injury
as a result of the negligence of his employer and a defect in the
equipment on which he works. The employee receives $10,000 in
workers' compensation from his employer, then sues the manufac-
turer of the equipment. The jury finds the manufacturer liable for
the employee's damages of $100,000. The manufacturer brings a
third party action against the employer in indemnity, alleging that
the employer actively caused the employee's injuries, while the
manufacturer was only a passive cause.
At this point, the manufacturer has a judgment against him
for $100,000. He will pay $10,000 of that to the employer or his
insurance carrier to cover the workers' compensation payment
made to the employee, and $90,000 to the employee. Thus, the em-
ployee will receive the full amount of his loss, $100,000. The manu-
facturer will have paid $100,000; the employer will have paid
nothing.
Let us now assume two alternative outcomes in the manufac-
turer's action for implied indemnity from the employer. First, if
the manufacturer succeeds on his indemnity theory, the employer
must pay the $100,000. Alternatively, if the manufacturer does not
succeed, he must pay the $100,000 judgment himself. Thus, the
third party action reallocates all or nothing; either the employer or
the manufacturer will bear the entire loss. In either case, the em-
ployee will receive full compensation.
The Fault Model. The goal of the fault model is to distribute
loss according to fault. This model assumes that the jury can de-
termine fault if instructed to do so. According to the fault model,
then, the jury's verdict on implied indemnity should bear some re-
lationship to the fault of the parties.
115. See generally Calabresi, supra note 1. For a slightly different statement of the
general model, not distinguishing between primary and secondary accident costs, see
Walkowiak, supra note 16, at 540-42.
116. This section does not discuss the situation in which contribution is available, since
Houdaille does not affect that kind of case.
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In Houdaille, the supreme court expressly restricted the scope
of implied indemnity, in part because the court believed that trial
courts and juries were using implied indemnity to distribute cost
according to the manufacturer's and employer's relative degrees of
fault.' 71 Under that view, if a jury believed that a manufacturer
was 50% or more at fault, then the jury would not allow implied
indemnity; thus, the manufacturer would bear 100% of the loss. If,
on the other hand, the jury believed that the employer was 51 % or
more at fault, it would find the manufacturer entitled to implied
indemnity, and the employer would bear 100% of the loss."' The
jury allowed the manufacturer indemnity if his fault was 49% or
less. If indemnity actions were evenly distributed over all possible
percentages of fault, then in as many as 49% of the cases the jury
would allow 100% recovery from the employer, and the loss would
almost always fall upon the party most at fault. 1 9 Although the
fault model would allocate the loss to both parties if both are at
fault, implied indemnity provides a rough approximation to alloca-
tion of loss according to fault, where workers' compensation law
makes an employer immune to contribution.
The Compensation Model. The goal of the compensation
model is to provide immediate and complete compensation of all
injuries. In the examples given above, the employee is compen-
sated for 100% of his injuries, but must resort to the courts to
recover most of his compensation. Thus, in these examples, the law
only approximates the goal of the model.120 This is true, irrespec-
117. The court made this assumption in holding that it would no longer recognize the
"active/passive" rationale for indemnification. 374 So. 2d at 493. If the court was correct,
then the jury was assigning 100% of the loss to whichever party the jury believed was most
at fault.
118. It is of course unnecessary to assume that the jury is making such a fine distinc-
tion between the fault of the indemnitor and the indemnitee. If the jury follows its instruc-
tions at all, it will set a higher threshold. To simplify, however, we will assume that the jury
makes any possible distinction, down to and including the 51%/49% split of fault.
119. There is no empirical evidence that manufacturers are more likely than employers
to be culpably at fault in industrial accidents. In the absence of such data, all we can as-
sume is that both parties are involved. Further, we do not know whether the manufacturer
and the employer in any particular case share the fault equally. But it seems reasonable
again to assume that over the class of all accidents the employer is more at fault as often as
is the manufacturer.
120. Note the analogy to primary and secondary costs in the model of allocation of
resources. Here, the primary compensation is the $10,000 recovery under workers' compen-
sation. The employee must sue for the remaining $90,000, thereby incurring secondary costs.
Although attorney's fees and certain unrecoverable costs usually reduce the amount of the
employee's recovery, trial attorneys generally assume that the jury awards the plaintiff more
than his true damages, to cover attorney's fees. Thus, this paper treats secondary costs as
constant and safe to ignore.
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tive of the actions of the jury vis-a-vis the employer in the indem-
nity action. The compensation model views the legal battle be-
tween the manufacturer and the employer as essentially irrelevant
to the primary goal, compensation. 12 1
The Economic Allocation of Resources Model. As indicated
above, the critical issue for the model of economic allocation of re-
sources often reduces to the question whether to distribute pro
rata the cost of the accident to the enterprises "involved" in the
accident. 12  To reach this point in the application of the rule, a
court must first determine how many enterprises there are,
whether these enterprises are "involved" in the accident, and
whether they can be distinguished on the basis of risk awareness,
loss distribution, and non-externalization.
At least two enterprises appear in the hypothetical relation-
ship between the employer, employee, and manufacturer stated
above. The manufacturer makes and sells equipment used in the
fabrication of another product by the employer and employee. The
equipment could be used in the manufacture of other products; al-
ternatively, the employer could select other kinds of brands of
equipment to continue manufacturing his present product.128
Thus, the manufacturer and the employer represent different en-
terprises. 2 4 The accident, however, "involves" both enterprises. 125
The employee is using the manufacturer's product (the equipment)
to make his employer's product when his injury occurs.
Only the trier of fact can finally determine which enterprise
could best bear the risk. Whether the employer or the manufac-
121. Of course, the manufacturer's claim for indemnity from the employer is external to
the compensation system. If the indemnity action begins simultaneously with the action by
the employee against the manufacturer, then there is some chance that the employee's costs
will increase during the prolonged trial required for the manufacturer to prove his case
against the employer. On the other hand, the battle between the manufacturer and em-
ployer will reduce the burden on the employee in proving his case. Thus, although the pres-
ence of the employer in the same action increases the costs to the employee who must pay
for a longer trial, his burden is 'accordingly reduced by the defense of the employer who
must show that the manufacturer is at fault. This analysis treats the cost of extended litiga-
tion as balanced by the lowered cost of proving the plaintiff's case in chief.
122. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
123. Calabresi, supra note 105, at 508.
124. Analytically, even the employer and the employee may engage in different enter-
prises. Where the employee is represented by a union or collective bargaining agent, his
power increases and his product (labor) can properly be distinguished from the product of
the employer's enterprise. See Calabresi, supra note 1, at 728 n.22. For the purpose of this
paper, however, it is unnecessary to separate the enterprises of the employer and the
employee.
125. See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
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turer best exemplifies risk awareness, loss distribution, and non-
externalization must depend on many unknowns. These include
the magnitude of each one's involvement in the creation of the
risk, his bargaining relationship with the other and with other en-
terprises, and his ability to insure against loss. Only detailed analy-
sis of the particular relationship existing in a unique employer-
manufacturer pair can provide a basis for decision. 12 6
In the hypothetical example, the loss will never be allocated
on a pro rata basis, because 100% of the loss will always fall on
either the employer or the employee. If the cases are distributed
equally over all combinations of manufacturer and employer fault,
then in approximately 51% of the cases the manufacturer will bear
the loss and in 49% of the cases the employer will bear the loss.
Each set of enterprises will bear a pro rata share across all cases,
statistically satisfying the allocation of resources model. 127
C. Application of the Models to the Workers' Compensation
Problem after Houdaille.
The Fault Model. The Houdaille decision virtually eliminates
an action for indemnity 'between the manufacturer and the em-
ployer. The manufacturer will now bear 100% of the loss 100% of
the time. If the fault of the employer and that of the manufacturer
are evenly distributed across all fault-probability pairings, the loss
will now be allocated to the less culpable party in 49% of the
cases. 1 28 Before Houdaille, the loss was allocated to the more cul-
pable party 100% of the time.2 9 Thus, the fault model views the
net result of Houdaille as reducing the quality of accident law.
The Compensation Model. The elimination of implied indem-
nity has no substantial effect on the compensation model. The em-
ployee continues to be partially compensated through worker's
compensation. He still must sue the manufacturer to get complete
compensation. As the goal of the compensation model is complete
compensation of the injured party, the decision rule indicates that
this goal is accomplished accomplished equally well after the
Houdaille decision. Thus, the compensation model would neither
support nor undercut validity of the change in the law created by
Houdaille.
126. See text accompanying notes 109-12 supra.
127. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
128. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
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The Economic Allocation of Resources Model. As shown
above, there is no method of determining which of the enterprises
has the best accident awareness, risk allocation, or non-externaliza-
tion characteristics.130 The test reduces to distribution of the loss
on a pro rata basis among the enterprises "involved" in the acci-
dent. Before Houdaille, the loss from economic accidents jointly
caused by manufacturers and employers would be divided equally
between them across all such accidents, and both sets of enter-
prises would bear some of the loss. After Houdaille, only the man-
ufacturers will bear the loss. The enterprise of the employer will
never bear the cost of its own negligence. Hence, under the eco-
nomic allocation of resources model, the Houdaille decision was
incorrect.
D. Equitable Conclusions
On the basis of reasonable statistical hypotheses, the model of
the economic allocation of resources and the fault model suggest
that the supreme court incorrectly eliminated implied indemnity
between a manufacturer and an employer, both of whom are negli-
gent. The compensation model remains neutral in this case. If two
of the models disfavor a change in the law and none favors it, the
decisionmaker should not make the change."3 ' In achieving legal
consistency by subsuming implied indemnity under the fault con-
cept, the supreme court has moved the law away from two of the
three goals of accident law. Absent another mechanism to achieve
justice between an employer and manufacturer, such as contribu-
tion, one must conclude that the court decided Houdaille
incorrectly.
VIII. REMEDIES
Since the passage of the 1976 amendments to the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,1"2 the Supreme Court of
Florida has issued two inequitable opinions on implied indemnity.
In Stuart v. Hertz Corp.,"'3 the court refused to allow expansion of
implied indemnity to provide equitable relief to a negligent motor-
ist held liable for all of the plaintiff's injuries, including those
caused by the successive negligence of a malpracticing doctor. The
130. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
131. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
132. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979).
133. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
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court ruled that since the motorist and the doctor were successive
rather than joint tortfeasors, the motorist was not entitled to con-
tribution.'34 In HoudaiUe, the court refused to permit implied in-
demnity as i mechanism for equitable loss distribution to an em-
ployer who was not a joint tortfeasor and hence not subject to
contribution.' 85 The common elements in both cases were the ab-
sence of contribution as an alternative mechanism for loss alloca-
tion and the refusal of the court to use implied indemnity to allo-
cate loss based on fault.
In response to the decision in Stuart v. Hertz Corp.,"6 the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the initial
tortfeasor may bring a separate law suit for subrogation against a
successive tortfeasor, such as a doctor, whose negligence aggravates
the original injuries. 1 7 The Fourth District certified its decision to
the Supreme Court of Florida as passing upon a question of great
public interest. Approving the district court's decision, the su-
preme court declared in Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauder-
dale Lakes,"83 that an initial tortfeasor has a cause of action under
a theory of subrogation against a successor tortfeasor. Relying on
principles of fairness, restitution, equity, and good conscience, the
court aligned Florida with other jurisdictions which recognize sub-
134. Id. at 705. There can be no question that doctoring is a different enterprise from
driving an automobile for whatever purpose. Before the Stuart decision, a negligent driver
could shift the loss attributable to the malpracticing doctor (the successive tortfeasor),
thereby placing the cost of the doctoring enterprise on the medical profession and the doc-
tor who was at fault. After Stuart, the driver, who is much less culpable than the doctor
with respect to the malpractice injuries and whose enterprise bears little relationship to the
doctor's, must bear the entire loss.
135. See 374 So. 2d at 492; text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
136. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977); see text accompanying note 133 supra.
137. In City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 373 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1979), the district court asserted:
We do not believe that our decision here is at odds with Hertz, for this is no
third party action which will make the plaintiff's claim longer and more com-
plex. Nor is it the plaintiff who is suing the treating physician. Rather it is an
active tortfeasor who, by way of subrogation, understandably seeks retribution
for that portion of the plaintiff's injuries directly attributable to the negligence
of another. Other jurisdictions have permitted such a remedy.
Id. at 945.
The district court was clearly concerned about the inequitable results of not accepting
subrogation as a mechanism for loss allocation:
Our conclusion is reached not only on our version of common sense, but also on
our concept of fundamental fairness. To us it makes no sense to allow a negli-
gent physician to receive total immunity for his folly because of a prior, and
possibly minor, injury inflicted by the negligence of another.
373 So. 2d at 946.
138. 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1980).
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rogation as a remedy enabling an initial tortfeasor to seek an equi-
table apportionment of liability with a subsequent tortfeasor.
In contrast to the strict requirement of Houdaille that an in-
demnitee be without "fault," subrogation allocates loss without re-
ferring exclusively to fault. If the legal obligation that the initial
tortfeasor must pay ought to have been paid either in whole or in
part by another, subrogation allows justice to be done without re-
gard to the technical requirements of indemnity. 139
Subrogation, however, will offer no relief to a manufacturer in
the Houdaille situation, found liable to the injured worker but
barred from bringing an indemnity action against the employer. It
makes no sense to say that the manufacturer is subrogated to the
rights of the injured worker, since under the workers' compensa-
tion statute, the manufacturer can be liable only for all of the
plaintiff's injuries; there is no basis for saying that some of the in-
juries result from the manufacturer's actions and some from the
employer's actions.140
Changes in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act,14 1 providing for contribution and reallocation of portions of
the plaintiff's loss, might solve both the problem of successive
tortfeasors and that of workers' compensation immunity. First, the
Act should be amended to include successive tortfeasors by elimi-
nating the "joint" requirement from section 2(a):
Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more per-
sons become [jointly or severally] liable in tort for the same in-
jury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there
is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has
not been recovered against all or any of them."'
This amendment would permit the courts to bring into one action
139. The supreme court asked the rhetorical question whether the result of the decision
in Hertz was fair and equitable, in allowing the negligent doctor to avoid responsibility for
his actions and requiring the initial tortfeasor to shoulder the total financial burden of the
victim's injuries. The court answered the question by insisting that equity and good con-
science should afford the initial tortfeasor a remedy: "The initial tortfeasor is simply trying
to recoup his losses that in fairness should be shared with a negligent doctor. Under this
doctrine the financial burden is equitably apportioned among the responsible parties, and
negligent doctors can no longer escape liability for their actions." Id. at 704.
140. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1979) provides that the employer's obligation to provide an
injured worker with statutory compensation is "exclusive" and in place of "all other liability
of such employer," presumably including the newly fashioned remedy of apportionment of
liability based upon subrogation.
141. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979).
142. Id. § 768.31(2)(a) (brackets added). Proper amendment requires excision of the
bracketed language.
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all parties who have contributed to the plaintiff's losses, other than
those with a statutory or common law immunity, and distribute
the loss according to the fault of the respective parties.
Second, the problem of the workers' compensation immunity
of the employer may be solved by an additional clause that has
been suggested by Dean Wade,1 3 advisor for the Restatement of
Torts (Second)14 4 and Chairman of the Committee drafting the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act.145 Dean Wade has expressed
doubts about the Act's ability to handle the workers' compensation
immunity.1 ' Accordingly, he has suggested an amendment to the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act that would fit equally well into
the Contribution Act:
[Section 6a. Action by Employee Against Third-Party
Defendant.]
(a) If an employee who has claimed or is entitled to claim
against the employer benefits under [the workers' compensation
act] brings a tort action against another person to recover addi-
tional damages for the injury, the employer may be joined by
the defendant as a party for the purpose of determining the per-
centage of fault allocable in accordance with Section 2 to the
employer in comparison with the combined fault of all of the
parties, including the claimant.
(b) On the basis of those findings the court shall determine
the award to the claimant by subtracting from the amount of
the damages half of the amount that, except for the [workers'
compensation act], would have been allocated as the primary re-
sponsibility of the employer; and it shall render judgment in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Section 2. After paying the judg-
ment, the defendant may recover from the employer the other
half of the amount that would have been allocated to the
employer. 7
Dean Wade suggests that the loss attributable to the negligence of
the employer should fall on either the employee or the employer,
or be divided between them.1 4 8 The proposed amendment set forth
above allows the manufacturer to recover from the employer half
the amount of the plaintiff's judgment. We suggest that this fair
and equitable solution to the problem created by the Houdaille
143. Wade, supra note 23.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
145. Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 32 (Supp. 1979).
146. Wade, supra note 23, at 388.
147. Id. at 390.
148. Id. at 388.
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decision should be adopted as an amendment to the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Under that amendment, fault
would remain the basis for loss distribution, with justice and eq-
uity preserved in accident law.
